Foxit PDF Reader versions prior to 4.3.1.0218 expose the JavaScript API function createDataObject() in a way that allows untrusted PDF content to write arbitrary files to attacker-controlled locations on disk. A malicious PDF can invoke this API to drop files such as executables or scripts outside the intended document context, including into sensitive or auto-start locations. This is effectively an arbitrary file write issue reachable through embedded JavaScript in a PDF document, and it can be leveraged to achieve subsequent code execution when the written payload is later executed by the operating system or user session startup mechanisms.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module targeting Foxit PDF Reader 4.2 on Windows. The exploit leverages an unsafe JavaScript API (createDataObject) in Foxit Reader to write arbitrary files to the filesystem when a specially crafted PDF is opened. The module generates a PDF that, when opened by an administrative user, writes a base64-encoded payload and a decoder script to the Windows Startup folder and Temp directory. Upon the next system reboot or user login, the payload is decoded and executed, resulting in code execution with user privileges. The exploit is operational, requiring administrative privileges to succeed due to the target directory's permissions. The code is written in Ruby and is structured as a standard Metasploit exploit module, with options for customizing the output filename and decoder script. No network endpoints are involved; the attack vector is a malicious file (PDF) delivered to the target.
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