Loading vulnerability…
A stack-based buffer overflow exists in the ReadS3M method of load_s3m.cpp in Libmodplug versions prior to 0.8.8.2. The vulnerability is triggered by insufficient validation of the number of instruments and patterns in a user-supplied S3M file, which are used as parameters in a memcpy operation. This allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by enticing a user to open a crafted S3M file in any application using the vulnerable library.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (vlc_modplug_s3m.rb) that exploits a stack buffer overflow vulnerability (CVE-2011-1574) in the libmod_plugin.dll component of VideoLAN VLC media player versions prior to 1.1.9 (tested on 1.1.8, Windows XP SP3). The exploit works by generating a specially crafted S3M (Scream Tracker 3 Module) file that, when opened by a vulnerable VLC instance, triggers a buffer overflow, allowing for arbitrary code execution. The module constructs the S3M file with a custom ROP chain to bypass DEP (but not ASLR) and embeds user-supplied shellcode (payload) into the file. The exploit is user-assisted: the attacker must convince a target to open the malicious file. The only fingerprintable endpoint is the generated file itself (default name: msf.s3m). The code is written in Ruby and is structured as a standard Metasploit exploit module, with all logic contained in a single file.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
No public activity tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
No public activity observed for this vulnerability.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.