A critical vulnerability exists in the Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client (formerly AnyConnect VPN Client) prior to version 2.3.185 on Windows and on Windows Mobile, where the helper application downloads a client executable (vpndownloader.exe) without verifying its authenticity. The vulnerability is present in the ActiveX control (vpnweb.ocx) used for web-based installation, which incorrectly reports itself as safe for scripting and initialization. This allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by supplying a malicious URL to the ActiveX control, typically by luring a user to a crafted web page. The vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2011-2039 (Cisco Bug ID CSCsy00904).
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This repository contains a single Metasploit module (modules/exploits/windows/browser/cisco_anyconnect_exec.rb) that exploits a vulnerability (CVE-2011-2039) in the Cisco AnyConnect VPN Client's ActiveX control (vpnweb.ocx) on Windows. The exploit works by serving a malicious web page to the victim, which instantiates the vulnerable ActiveX control and sets its 'url' property to point to the attacker's server. The control then downloads and executes a file (vpndownloader.exe) provided by the attacker, which contains a customizable Metasploit payload. The module also serves an 'updates.txt' file as part of the control's expected behavior. The exploit is weaponized, allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary code on the victim's system. The attack vector is browser-based, requiring user interaction (visiting a malicious page) and a vulnerable configuration (the ActiveX control installed and enabled). The code is written in Ruby and is structured as a standard Metasploit exploit module.
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