CVE-2012-0266 describes multiple stack-based buffer overflow vulnerabilities in the NTR ActiveX control prior to version 2.0.4.8. The vulnerabilities are triggered by passing overly long strings to several parameters (bstrUrl and bstrParams) in the StartModule, Check, Download, and DownloadModule methods. These overflows occur during the construction of .ntr pathnames or URLs, allowing for the possibility of overwriting stack memory.
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This repository contains a single Metasploit module (Ruby file) that exploits a buffer overflow vulnerability (CVE-2012-0266) in the Check() method of the NTR ActiveX 1.1.8 control. The exploit is delivered via a malicious HTML page served by the attacker's HTTP server. When a victim visits the page using a vulnerable version of Internet Explorer (6-9) on Windows XP SP3, Vista, or 7, and has the vulnerable ActiveX control installed, the exploit triggers a buffer overflow by passing crafted data to the Check() method. The module uses JavaScript heap spraying and ROP chains to bypass DEP/ASLR on newer Windows versions (with JRE 6 required for Vista/7). The payload is fully configurable via Metasploit and allows for arbitrary code execution in the context of the user. The main fingerprintable endpoints are the HTTP URL used to deliver the exploit and the CLSID of the targeted ActiveX control. The repository is operational and weaponized, as it is part of the Metasploit framework and supports customizable payloads.
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