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SugarCRM Community Edition versions 6.3.1 and earlier contain scripts that invoke the PHP function unserialize() on user-controlled input. This allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary PHP objects, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution if a suitable gadget chain is present in the application or its dependencies.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit module targeting a PHP unserialize() vulnerability (CVE-2012-0694) in SugarCRM versions 6.3.1 and earlier. The exploit requires valid user credentials and abuses the 'current_query_by_page' parameter in a POST request to 'index.php', triggering a vulnerable unserialize() call in the application. The module crafts a serialized payload that leverages the SugarTheme class's __destruct() method to write a malicious PHP file ('pathCache.php') to the web root. The attacker can then execute arbitrary PHP code by sending a GET request to this file with a base64-encoded payload in the 'Cmd' HTTP header. The module includes cleanup functionality to remove the malicious file after exploitation. The code is written in Ruby and is structured as a standard Metasploit exploit module, making use of the HttpClient mixin for network communication. The main entry point is the 'exploit' method, which handles authentication, exploitation, and payload execution. No hardcoded IPs or external domains are present; all endpoints are relative to the target's web application path.
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