XBMC version 11, including builds up to the 2012-11-04 nightly release, contains a path traversal vulnerability in its embedded HTTP server. When the HTTP interface is accessed using HTTP Basic Authentication, the server does not properly sanitize URI path input before resolving requested resources. This allows an authenticated attacker to traverse outside the intended web document root and access arbitrary files on the underlying host filesystem. The issue is an arbitrary file-read vulnerability affecting the embedded web server component rather than a code execution flaw.
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What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
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Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit auxiliary module (modules/auxiliary/gather/xbmc_traversal.rb) that exploits a directory traversal vulnerability in XBMC 11 (up to the 2012-11-04 nightly build). The module allows an attacker to download arbitrary files from the XBMC web server by sending a crafted HTTP GET request with directory traversal sequences. The exploit requires valid HTTP credentials (default: xbmc/xbmc) and targets the web server running on port 8080 by default. The module is operational, providing file download capability but not remote code execution. The code is written in Ruby and is structured as a standard Metasploit module, with configurable options for the target file path, traversal depth, and HTTP credentials. The main attack vector is network-based, leveraging HTTP requests to exploit the vulnerability.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
4 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.