CVE-2012-10032 is a cross-context scripting (XCS) vulnerability in Maxthon3 prior to version 3.3. The issue affects the browser's about:history page, where script content can be injected and then executed within a trusted or privileged browser context. Because the trusted zone improperly handles the injected content, arbitrary JavaScript can run with elevated browser privileges rather than normal web-origin restrictions. The exposed privileged DOM APIs available in that context include functions such as maxthon.program.Program.launch() and maxthon.io.writeDataURL(), which can be abused to launch programs and write attacker-controlled data. As a result, a malicious webpage can trigger script execution in the privileged context after user interaction.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module targeting a Cross Context Scripting (XCS) vulnerability in the Maxthon 3 browser's about:history page (CVE-2012-10032). The exploit leverages the trusted zone of the browser to inject JavaScript, which in turn writes and executes an attacker-supplied payload (EXE) on the victim's Windows system. The module sets up a malicious HTTP server that serves different JavaScript payloads depending on the request URI. The attack is triggered when a victim using a vulnerable version of Maxthon 3 visits the attacker's server. The exploit is operational, as it delivers and executes a real payload, but is limited to specific Maxthon 3 versions due to changes in the browser's API in later releases. The code is structured as a standard Metasploit module, with the main logic in the 'on_request_uri' method, and uses both Ruby (for the module) and JavaScript (for the browser payload).
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5 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
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YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.