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Openfiler v2.x contains a command injection vulnerability in the system.html page. The vulnerable input is the device parameter, which is used to instantiate a NetworkCard object. In network.inc, the NetworkCard constructor passes this attacker-controlled value to exec() without proper sanitization, allowing shell metacharacter injection. An authenticated attacker can exploit this flaw to execute arbitrary commands in the context of the openfiler user. Because the sudoers configuration permits the openfiler user to run /bin/bash via sudo without a password, successful exploitation can be chained into full root privilege escalation.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module targeting Openfiler v2.x (CVE-2012-10040). The exploit abuses a command injection vulnerability in the 'device' parameter of the '/admin/system.html' endpoint, allowing authenticated users to execute arbitrary commands as the 'openfiler' user. The module then escalates privileges by running 'sudo /bin/bash', as the 'openfiler' user can do so without a password. The exploit requires valid credentials and network access to the Openfiler web interface (default port 446, HTTPS). The code is written in Ruby and follows standard Metasploit module structure, with options for username, password, SSL, and port. The payload is customizable and supports various command execution methods. The repository is operational and ready for use within the Metasploit framework.
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No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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