Loading vulnerability…
CVE-2012-10042 affects Sflog! CMS 1.0. The blog management interface exposes an authenticated file upload function via manage.php. The upload implementation does not properly validate or restrict uploaded file types, allowing an authenticated user to upload arbitrary files, including executable PHP code. Because uploaded files are placed in a web-accessible directory at blogs/download/uploads/, an attacker can upload a PHP backdoor or web shell and then invoke it over HTTP. The issue is especially severe because the product ships with default credentials (admin:secret), which can provide trivial access to the authenticated upload functionality if unchanged.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (modules/exploits/multi/http/sflog_upload_exec.rb) that exploits an arbitrary file upload vulnerability in Sflog! CMS 1.0 (CVE-2012-10042). The exploit targets the web application's admin interface, which by default uses the credentials admin:secret. The module logs in to the admin panel, uploads a PHP payload (backdoor) via the /admin/manage.php endpoint, and then executes it by requesting the uploaded file in the /blogs/download/uploads/ directory. The exploit leverages Metasploit's payload generation capabilities, allowing for customizable PHP or Linux x86 payloads. The module is weaponized, providing full remote code execution on the target server. The code is written in Ruby and is structured as a standard Metasploit exploit module, with clear separation of login, upload, and execution logic. No hardcoded IPs or external domains are present, but the endpoints for exploitation are clearly defined within the code.
3 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.