The Lenovo ThinkManagement Console 9.0.3 contains an unrestricted file upload vulnerability in the ServerSetup web service (andesk/managementsuite/core/core.anonymous/ServerSetup.asmx). Remote attackers can exploit this by sending a specially crafted RunAMTCommand SOAP request with a PutUpdateFileCore command, allowing them to upload files with executable extensions to the web root. The attacker can then execute arbitrary code by directly accessing the uploaded file.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit module targeting LANDesk Lenovo ThinkManagement Suite versions 9.0.2 and 9.0.3 running on Microsoft Windows Server 2003 SP2. The exploit leverages SOAP-based web service endpoints to upload a malicious ASP script containing a Metasploit payload to the server. The payload is uploaded via a POST request to '/landesk/managementsuite/core/core.anonymous/ServerSetup.asmx' using the 'RunAMTCommand' operation. Once uploaded, the ASP script is executed by sending a GET request to its location (e.g., '/ldlogon/<random>.asp'), resulting in remote code execution. After execution, the module attempts to clean up by deleting the ASP file via another SOAP request to '/WSVulnerabilityCore/VulCore.asmx' using the 'SetTaskLogByFile' operation. The module is operational and allows the attacker to execute arbitrary code on the target system, as defined by the chosen Metasploit payload. The code is well-structured and leverages Metasploit's HttpClient and EXE utilities for payload generation and delivery.
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