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CVE-2012-2459 is an unspecified vulnerability in bitcoind and Bitcoin-Qt prior to versions 0.4.6, 0.5.5, 0.6.0.7, and 0.6.2, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service by triggering a block-processing outage and incorrect block count through unknown behavior on the Bitcoin network. The exact mechanism of exploitation is not detailed, but it affects the core block processing logic of the affected Bitcoin clients.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This is a 19-file .NET 8/C# educational Merkle-tree library and CLI, not a network-delivered exploit repository. Core code implements Bitcoin double-SHA256 Merkle roots, byte-order conversion for displayed txids, RFC 6962 domain-separated hashing, membership proofs, and immutable-copy handling. The CLI in src/ArvoreMerkle.Cli/Programa.cs reads local files to calculate a generic root, produce a membership proof, validate static Bitcoin block vectors, or demonstrate proof-size scaling. Bitcoin.cs contains the CVE-2012-2459 proof-of-concept: Duplicacao.Forjar appends the final leaf of an odd-sized list, preserving the Bitcoin-style Merkle root, while TemParDuplicado identifies the adjacent duplicate-pair pattern that should be rejected. Tests demonstrate the collision for 3, 5, 7, and 9 leaves and validate roots against four locally stored Bitcoin mainnet block vectors. No HTTP client, socket, peer-to-peer protocol, block serialization, signing, or transaction/block broadcast functionality exists; Blockstream URLs occur only as comments documenting the source of bundled test data.
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