Loading vulnerability…
A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in Lattice Semiconductor PAC-Designer version 6.2.1344. The vulnerability is triggered when a remote attacker provides a specially crafted PAC Design (.pac) file containing an excessively long string in a Value tag within a SymbolicSchematicData definition tag. This can cause a buffer overflow on the stack, potentially allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary code in the context of the user running the application.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (lattice_pac_bof.rb) that exploits a stack buffer overflow vulnerability (CVE-2012-2915) in Lattice Semiconductor PAC-Designer version 6.21 for Windows. The exploit works by generating a specially crafted .pac file (default name: msf.pac) containing a malicious payload in the <Title> field and a buffer overflow trigger in the <Value> field of the XML structure. When a user opens this file with the vulnerable application, arbitrary code execution is achieved under the user's context. The module allows for customizable Metasploit payloads and targets specifically Windows XP SP3 running PAC-Designer 6.21. The attack vector is local, requiring user interaction to open the malicious file. The repository is structured as a standard Metasploit exploit module and is fully weaponized, supporting payload customization and integration with the Metasploit framework.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
No public activity tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
No public activity observed for this vulnerability.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.