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CVE-2012-3811 is an unrestricted file upload vulnerability in the ImageUpload.ashx handler of the Wallboard application in Avaya IP Office Customer Call Reporter versions 7.0 (prior to 7.0.5.8 Q1 2012 Maintenance Release) and 8.0 (prior to 8.0.9.13 Q1 2012 Maintenance Release). The flaw allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to upload arbitrary files, including executables, to the server. By subsequently accessing the uploaded file via a direct request, attackers can execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the web server process.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (avaya_ccr_imageupload_exec.rb) that exploits an authentication bypass and arbitrary file upload vulnerability (CVE-2012-3811) in Avaya IP Office Customer Call Reporter (CCR) versions 7.0.4.2 and 8.0.8.15 on Windows Server 2003 SP2. The exploit abuses the ImageUpload.ashx endpoint to upload a malicious ASPX file containing a Windows executable payload (such as Meterpreter), then executes it by making an HTTP GET request to the uploaded file. The module is fully weaponized, allowing the attacker to gain remote code execution on the target system. The main fingerprintable endpoint is '/CCRWebClient/Wallboard/ImageUpload.ashx', and the payload is stored in the '../../CCRWallboardMessageBroker/' directory on the server. The exploit is part of the Metasploit framework and is implemented in Ruby.
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