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A stack-based buffer overflow exists in the get_history function of history.cgi in Nagios Core before 3.4.4 and Icinga versions 1.6.x before 1.6.2, 1.7.x before 1.7.4, and 1.8.x before 1.8.4. The vulnerability is triggered by supplying an overly long value to the 'host_name' (host parameter) or 'svc_description' variables, which are not properly bounds-checked before being copied to a stack buffer, potentially allowing for arbitrary code execution.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (modules/exploits/unix/webapp/nagios3_history_cgi.rb) targeting a command injection vulnerability in the Nagios3 history.cgi script (CVE-2012-6096). The exploit works by sending a specially crafted HTTP GET request to the history.cgi endpoint, injecting a command via the 'host' parameter. The module supports automatic detection of the target version and platform (CentOS or Debian) and uploads a custom ELF payload (such as a reverse shell) to the /tmp directory on the target system, then executes it. The exploit requires valid Nagios3 credentials and knowledge of the correct path to history.cgi. The code is operational and leverages Metasploit's payload generation and session handling capabilities. The main attack vector is network-based, exploiting a web application endpoint. The only fingerprintable endpoints are the default CGI path and the temporary file used for payload execution.
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