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A remote code execution vulnerability exists in Microsoft Windows XP SP2 and SP3, Windows Server 2003 SP2, Windows Vista SP2, and Windows Server 2008 SP2. The vulnerability is triggered when a user opens a specially crafted theme file containing a malicious screensaver. The theme file can reference a screensaver that, when loaded, allows arbitrary code execution in the context of the user.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (ms13_071_theme.rb) that exploits CVE-2013-0810, a vulnerability in the handling of Windows theme files (.theme) on Windows XP SP3 and Windows 2003 SP2. The exploit works by generating a malicious .theme file that sets the screensaver path (SCRNSAVE.EXE) in the [boot] section to an attacker-controlled SMB share. When the victim opens the theme file or the screensaver is triggered, Windows attempts to load the screensaver from the specified SMB path, resulting in the execution of a malicious .scr file (a Windows executable payload generated by Metasploit). The module leverages Metasploit's SMB server functionality to host the payload. The attack vector is a combination of file format (malicious theme file) and network (SMB share hosting the payload). The exploit is operational, providing remote code execution as the victim user. No hardcoded IPs or domains are present; the SMB UNC path is dynamically generated by the module.
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