CVE-2013-10032 is an authenticated remote code execution vulnerability in GetSimpleCMS 3.2.1. The flaw is present in the application's upload.php endpoint, which permits authenticated users to upload files without properly validating file type by MIME type and extension. The upload protection relies on blacklist-based filtering rather than a strict allowlist, enabling an attacker to upload a server-executable file such as a .pht file containing PHP code. By using a crafted request and a polyglot or disguised extension, the attacker can place executable code in the web root and then invoke it directly through the web server, resulting in code execution on the target system.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module targeting a file upload vulnerability in GetSimple CMS (CVE-2013-10032). The exploit requires valid credentials for an authenticated user and targets the /admin/upload.php endpoint to upload a malicious PHP file. Upon successful upload, the module executes the payload by sending a GET request to the uploaded file. The exploit is operational, allowing arbitrary PHP code execution on vulnerable GetSimple CMS installations (version 3.1.2 and earlier). The code is written in Ruby and follows the standard Metasploit module structure, utilizing HTTP requests for authentication, file upload, and payload execution. The main endpoints involved are the admin login and file upload pages of the CMS.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.