CVE-2013-10058 is an authenticated OS command injection vulnerability affecting various Linksys router models, including tested WRT160Nv2 devices running firmware v2.0.03. The flaw is present in the web management interface's apply.cgi endpoint during diagnostic operations, where user-controlled input supplied to the ping_size parameter is not properly sanitized before being passed to the underlying operating system. An attacker with valid administrative or otherwise accepted web interface credentials can inject arbitrary shell metacharacters and commands through this parameter, resulting in remote command execution on the router.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module targeting Linksys WRT160n v2 routers (firmware v2.0.03) vulnerable to authenticated command injection via the /apply.cgi HTTP endpoint. The exploit requires valid credentials (default: admin/admin or admin/password) and leverages a POST request to inject commands through the 'ping_size' parameter. The module supports both direct command execution and deployment of a custom MIPS ELF payload, which is delivered to the router via a TFTP server started by the attacker. The payload is stored in /tmp on the device, made executable, and then run, granting the attacker remote code execution as root. The code is weaponized, supporting both command and binary payloads, and is part of the Metasploit framework. The only file in the repository is a Ruby script implementing the exploit logic.
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