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CVE-2013-10060 is an authenticated OS command injection vulnerability in Netgear router firmware, tested on the DGN2200B model, affecting firmware version 1.0.0.36 and prior. The flaw is exposed through the pppoe.cgi endpoint, where crafted input supplied to the pppoe_username parameter is not properly sanitized before being passed to the underlying operating system. An attacker who can authenticate to the device’s management interface can inject and execute arbitrary shell commands on the router, resulting in full device compromise.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (Ruby file) that exploits an authenticated command injection vulnerability (CVE-2013-10060) in the Netgear DGN2200B router's web interface. The exploit targets the /pppoe.cgi endpoint, requiring valid credentials (default: admin/admin or admin/password). It works by injecting commands into the router's configuration interface, allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary commands or download and run a MIPS ELF payload via wget. The module supports both command and binary payloads, and includes logic to backup and restore the router's configuration. The attack is performed over HTTP, and the exploit is operational, providing remote code execution on the target device. The code is structured as a standard Metasploit module, with clear separation of configuration, exploitation, and cleanup logic.
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4 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
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YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.