CVE-2013-10063 is a path traversal vulnerability in the embedded web server of Netgear SPH200D Skype phone firmware versions 1.0.4.80 and earlier. An authenticated attacker can send crafted HTTP GET requests containing directory traversal sequences to access files outside the intended web root. By failing to properly restrict or sanitize path input, the web server allows retrieval of arbitrary files from the underlying filesystem, which can expose sensitive system files and device configuration data.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit auxiliary scanner module targeting a directory traversal vulnerability (CVE-2013-10063) in the Netgear SPH200D Skype telephone's web interface. The module attempts to authenticate to the device using provided credentials (default: service/service), verifies the presence of the vulnerable web server, and then iterates through a list of sensitive file paths (from a wordlist) to exploit the directory traversal flaw. Successful exploitation allows the attacker to download arbitrary files from the device's filesystem. The code is written in Ruby and leverages Metasploit's HTTP client and scanner mixins. The main entry point is the 'run_host' method, which coordinates authentication and file retrieval attempts. The exploit is a proof-of-concept and does not provide a post-exploitation payload, but demonstrates the ability to read sensitive files from the target device.
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Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
5 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.