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A command injection vulnerability exists in the cgi-bin/admin/servetest endpoint of TP-Link IP Cameras (models TL-SC3130, TL-SC3130G, TL-SC3171, TL-SC3171G, and possibly others) prior to beta firmware LM.1.6.18P12_sign6. The vulnerability is due to improper sanitization of user-supplied input in the ServerName parameter and potentially other parameters, allowing remote attackers to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands on the device.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit module targeting the TP-Link SC2020n Network Video Camera (Linux platform). The exploit leverages an authenticated OS command injection vulnerability in the web interface at the /cgi-bin/admin/servetest endpoint (CVE-2013-2578). After authenticating with valid credentials (default admin/admin or user-supplied), the module injects a command to start a telnet daemon on a random high port, spawning a root shell. The attacker then connects to this telnet service to gain root access to the device. The module is written in Ruby and follows standard Metasploit conventions, with options for HTTP credentials and telnet timeouts. The main exploit logic is contained in the 'exploit' method, which performs authentication, triggers the vulnerability, and establishes a telnet session. The repository is operational and provides a working exploit with a basic, hardcoded payload (telnet shell).
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1 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.