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A stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability exists in BKFSim_vhfd.exe within multiple Yokogawa industrial control products, including CENTUM CS 1000, CS 3000 (and Small), VP (and Small/Basic), Exaopc, B/M9000CS, and B/M9000 VP. The vulnerability is triggered when the FCS/Test Function is enabled and a remote attacker sends a specially crafted packet to the affected process. This can result in the process crashing or allow for remote code execution with the privileges of the user running the process. The vulnerability is exploitable over the network without authentication.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module targeting a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability (CVE-2014-3888) in the Yokogawa Centum CS3000 SCADA system, specifically in the BKFSim_vhfd.exe service. The exploit works by sending a specially crafted UDP packet to port 20010, overflowing a buffer and allowing arbitrary code execution. The module is operational and allows the attacker to supply a custom Metasploit payload (up to 1770 bytes, avoiding null bytes). The exploit is configured for Yokogawa Centum CS3000 R3.08.50 running on Windows XP SP3. The repository is structured as a single Ruby file compatible with the Metasploit framework, and leverages Metasploit's UDP exploitation mixin for network communication. No hardcoded IP addresses or domain names are present; the main fingerprintable endpoints are the UDP port and the vulnerable executable.
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