A remote code execution vulnerability exists in X7 Chat versions 2.0.2 through 2.0.5.1, specifically in lib/message.php. The vulnerability arises from the unsafe use of PHP's preg_replace() function with the deprecated /e modifier, which evaluates user-supplied input as PHP code. Authenticated users can exploit this by sending a specially crafted offline message containing malicious PHP code, which is executed when the message is accessed, leading to arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the web server user.
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This repository contains a single Metasploit module (modules/exploits/multi/http/x7chat2_php_exec.rb) that exploits an authenticated remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2014-8998) in X7 Chat versions 2.0.0 through 2.0.5.1. The exploit targets a flaw in lib/message.php, where user-supplied input is passed to preg_replace() with the /e modifier, allowing arbitrary PHP code execution. The module requires valid credentials and the base path to the X7 Chat installation. It works by sending a crafted message and then triggering code execution via a custom HTTP header. The payload is arbitrary PHP code, base64-encoded, and can be used to gain full control of the target server. The structure is typical for a Metasploit exploit: it includes initialization, a check method, the main exploit logic, and payload delivery. The only relevant endpoints are the main index.php script of the X7 Chat installation and the vulnerable message.php file.
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