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A command injection vulnerability exists in the webcm CGI binary of AVM Fritz!Box routers running unpatched firmware. The vulnerability is due to improper sanitization of the 'var:lang' parameter, which is passed directly to a system() call, allowing remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via shell metacharacters. The vulnerable code path involves the Texas Instruments SSI Interpreter (TI_Interpreter). The issue was confirmed through static and dynamic analysis, including reverse engineering and emulation.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (modules/exploits/linux/http/fritzbox_echo_exec.rb) targeting an unauthenticated command injection vulnerability (CVE-2014-9727) in multiple AVM Fritz!Box router models. The exploit leverages the /cgi-bin/webcm HTTP endpoint, injecting commands via the 'var:lang' GET parameter. The module supports both MIPS Little Endian and Big Endian architectures, using Metasploit's command stager to deliver and execute arbitrary shell commands as root. The exploit is operational and can be used to gain full control over vulnerable Fritz!Box devices from the LAN side without authentication. The code is structured as a standard Metasploit exploit module, including check, exploit, and command execution routines. No hardcoded IPs or external domains are present; the only fingerprintable endpoint is the local web interface path (/cgi-bin/webcm) on the target device.
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