A vulnerability in the Group Policy Security Configuration policy implementation in multiple versions of Microsoft Windows allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to spoof domain controller responses. This can disable the signing requirement for Group Policy updates and trigger a revert-to-default action, effectively bypassing security controls enforced by Group Policy.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Python script (MS15_014.py) that implements a proof-of-concept exploit for Microsoft Windows vulnerability MS15-014 (CVE-2015-0008). The exploit targets Windows 7 SP1 and Server 2012 R2 systems by performing a man-in-the-middle attack using ARP spoofing and NetSed to intercept and corrupt SMB traffic between the target and its domain controllers. The script requires the attacker to specify the target IP, one or more domain controller IPs, and a network interface. It uses external tools (arpspoof, netsed, iptables) to redirect and modify network traffic, specifically corrupting the transfer of the SecEdit\GptTmpl.inf file. Successful exploitation disables SMB signing requirements on the target, making it susceptible to further attacks such as MS15-011. The script is a functional proof-of-concept and demonstrates the attack workflow, but does not provide a weaponized or easily customizable payload. The repository is structured as a single Python file with clear entry points and usage instructions.
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