CVE-2015-0936 is a critical vulnerability in Ceragon FibeAir IP-10 microwave backhaul devices, where a static, pre-generated SSH keypair for the 'mateidu' user is present in the authorized_keys file on all devices and in update packages. This allows remote attackers to gain SSH access to affected devices if they possess the corresponding private key, which is publicly accessible. The 'mateidu' user does not have root privileges by default, but attackers could leverage additional local vulnerabilities to escalate privileges. The vulnerability was discovered by HD Moore of Rapid7 and publicly disclosed after a fix was made available by Ceragon.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module targeting Ceragon FibeAir IP-10 devices (CVE-2015-0936). The exploit leverages a hardcoded SSH private key, which is shipped on these devices, to authenticate as the 'mateidu' user via SSH. The module attempts to connect to a specified target (RHOST) on port 22 (SSH), using the known private key for passwordless authentication. Upon successful login, it provides an interactive shell to the attacker. The exploit is operational, as it includes a working payload (the private key) and is designed for remote, network-based attacks. The only endpoints involved are the SSH service (port 22) on the target device and the embedded private key. The repository is structured as a single Ruby file compatible with the Metasploit framework, and is intended for use within that framework.
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