A vulnerability in JWT.php in F21 JWT before version 2.0 allows remote attackers to bypass signature verification by submitting specially crafted JWT tokens. The flaw is due to improper validation of the token's signature, enabling attackers to forge tokens that are accepted as valid without possessing the secret key.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
Repository is a Python JWT security testing toolkit (“claimjumper”) rather than a single exploit for one product. It provides: (1) JWT decoding and vulnerability analysis with risk scoring (claimjumper/decoder.py, analyzer.py), (2) token forging (alg=none and HS256 with a provided secret) (forger.py), (3) multi-threaded HMAC secret brute forcing for HS256/384/512 using built-in/common secrets and optional wordlists (cracker.py plus wordlists/jwt_secrets.txt; also references a Wallarm wordlist path), (4) an “advanced_attacks” module that generates multiple CVE/pattern-based attack tokens (notably CVE-2022-39227 algorithm confusion, CVE-2018-0114 key injection, CVE-2022-21449 psychic signature, CVE-2020-28042 null signature bypass, plus kid/jku/x5u/jwks spoofing and timestamp tampering), (5) a fuzzing engine with payload libraries for path traversal, SQLi, NoSQLi, command injection, SSRF, etc. (fuzzer.py), and (6) optional live HTTP replay/testing and a playbook-style scanner using `requests` (http_tester.py) that can inject tokens into requests and look for canary/response changes; it logs to jwt_attack.log. The primary entry point is the Click-based CLI (claimjumper/cli.py) exposing commands like analyze, crack, forge/forge-none, advanced-attacks, fuzz, keygen, and full-audit. A standalone local HTML UI (jwt_analyzer.html) provides basic client-side decoding/forging guidance but does not itself perform signing. Overall purpose: generate and test malicious JWT variants against vulnerable JWT verification implementations and assist in auditing JWT configurations.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
1 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
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Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.