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SysAid Help Desk versions prior to 15.2 use a hardcoded cryptographic key ('inigomontoya') for DES encryption with an MD5 hash. This key is used to encrypt sensitive information, such as the database password stored in WEB-INF/conf/serverConf.xml. The use of a static, hardcoded key allows attackers who obtain the key to decrypt sensitive data, especially if combined with other vulnerabilities that allow file download.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit auxiliary module (modules/auxiliary/admin/http/sysaid_sql_creds.rb) targeting SysAid Help Desk version 14.4 on both Windows and Linux. The module exploits an unauthenticated arbitrary file download vulnerability to retrieve the serverConf.xml configuration file via a crafted HTTP GET request to the '/sysaid/getGfiUpgradeFile' endpoint. The file contains the database username and an encrypted password, which the module decrypts using a static DES key ('inigomontoya' with a known salt). The module then reports the credentials and attempts to resolve and store the database server address and port. The exploit is operational, providing attackers with database credentials if the target is vulnerable. The code is written in Ruby and is designed to be run within the Metasploit framework.
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