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Bouncy Castle Java bcprov providers before version 1.51 do not validate that an elliptic-curve point supplied during Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement lies on the intended curve. An attacker can submit crafted invalid-curve points in repeated ECDH exchanges and use the resulting computations to recover information about the victim's long-term elliptic-curve private key.
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What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
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Patch, then assume compromise.
No public exploits tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
No public exploit code observed for this vulnerability.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A Bouncy Castle invalid-curve vulnerability that can allow extraction of elliptic-curve cryptography private keys after a few thousand queries.
A Bouncy Castle invalid-curve vulnerability that can allow extraction of elliptic-curve cryptography private keys after a few thousand queries.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.