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In secure-compare versions 3.0.0 and below, the compare function does not properly compare two input strings. Instead, it compares the first argument with itself, causing the function to return true for any two strings of the same length, regardless of their actual content. This undermines the intended security check, which is typically used to prevent timing attacks in string comparisons (e.g., for password or token validation).
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a wargame-style challenge based on a Node.js Express application. The main code is in 'deploy/app.js', which exposes several HTTP endpoints, most notably '/login'. The '/login' endpoint expects a POST request with a JSON body containing 'username' and 'password', and a custom header 'x-server-password'. If the password matches the server password (which defaults to 'password' in the code), the application reads and returns the contents of 'flag.txt'. There is a 5-second delay to deter brute-force attacks, and all login attempts are logged to 'server.log'. Other endpoints include '/static' for static files, '/cccc' for rendering a view, and '/chicken' for querying predefined objects, but direct access to the flag via '/chicken' is blocked. The repository includes a Dockerfile for deployment and a number of node_modules dependencies. The main attack vector is network-based, targeting the '/login' endpoint to retrieve the flag. The exploit is a proof-of-concept for logic flaws or weak authentication in custom Node.js applications.
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