A vulnerability in libs/binder/IMemory.cpp in the IMemory Native Interface of Android (versions 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-04-01) fails to properly consider the heap size, allowing a crafted application to exploit this oversight. This can result in privilege escalation, specifically enabling an attacker to obtain Signature or SignatureOrSystem access.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit for CVE-2016-0846, a vulnerability in the Android media framework. The main file, 'mypoc.cpp', is a C++ program that creates a fake memory object and interacts with the Android media crypto subsystem via Binder IPC. It attempts to trigger the vulnerability by passing crafted memory objects to the 'decrypt' function of the media crypto interface. The exploit is local and requires execution on a device with the appropriate Android libraries. The repository structure is simple, consisting of a README and the PoC source code. No network endpoints are present; the only fingerprintable endpoint is the file name used for the memory heap. The exploit demonstrates the vulnerability but does not provide a weaponized or fully automated attack.
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