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CVE-2016-10175 is an information disclosure vulnerability in the NETGEAR WNR2000v5 router, where the device's serial number is leaked via unauthenticated requests to the /BRS_netgear_success.html URI. This serial number can be used in conjunction with CVE-2016-10176 to reset the administrator password recovery questions, ultimately allowing an attacker to recover the administrator username and password. The vulnerability is present in all firmware versions of WNR2000v5 and likely affects v3 and v4 as well. The flaw is accessible from the LAN by default, and from the WAN if remote management is enabled.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit auxiliary module (modules/auxiliary/admin/http/netgear_wnr2000_pass_recovery.rb) targeting NETGEAR WNR2000 routers (primarily v5, but possibly v3/v4) with a vulnerability in their password recovery mechanism (CVE-2016-10175, CVE-2016-10176). The exploit works by brute-forcing a timestamp token used by the router's password recovery process, then automating the workflow to extract the administrator username and password. The module interacts with the router's web interface over HTTP, using several endpoints such as /BRS_netgear_success.html, /apply_noauth.cgi, and /passwordrecovered.cgi. The exploit is operational and, if successful, provides the attacker with the admin credentials for the device. The code is written in Ruby and is designed to be run within the Metasploit framework.
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