Loading vulnerability…
CVE-2016-10176 affects the NETGEAR WNR2000v5 router. The device exposes a special CGI endpoint, apply.cgi, intended for administrative use and processed by the embedded uhttpd web server to perform sensitive configuration actions. A second endpoint, apply_noauth.cgi, permits those same or similar sensitive actions without authentication. Because this unauthenticated interface can be used to modify router settings, including password-recovery question data, an attacker can abuse the exposed functionality to alter device state and ultimately achieve remote code execution on the router.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit auxiliary module (modules/auxiliary/admin/http/netgear_wnr2000_pass_recovery.rb) targeting NETGEAR WNR2000 routers (primarily v5, but possibly v3/v4) with a vulnerability in their password recovery mechanism (CVE-2016-10175, CVE-2016-10176). The exploit works by brute-forcing a timestamp token used by the router's password recovery process, then automating the workflow to extract the administrator username and password. The module interacts with the router's web interface over HTTP, using several endpoints such as /BRS_netgear_success.html, /apply_noauth.cgi, and /passwordrecovered.cgi. The exploit is operational and, if successful, provides the attacker with the admin credentials for the device. The code is written in Ruby and is designed to be run within the Metasploit framework.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
2 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.
No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.