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A vulnerability in the Content Security Policy (CSP) implementation in the Messages application on Apple OS X prior to version 10.11.4 allows remote attackers to bypass CSP restrictions and obtain sensitive information by leveraging the ability to inject or use a javascript: URL.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2016-1764, a vulnerability in Apple's Messages (iMessage) client for OS X Yosemite and El Capitan. The exploit leverages the application's use of an embedded WebKit instance that does not enforce the same-origin policy, allowing JavaScript execution via a crafted 'javascript:' URI link. When a victim clicks the malicious link, attacker-controlled JavaScript is executed in the context of the Messages app, enabling arbitrary file reads via XMLHttpRequest to 'file://' URIs. The payload (payload.js) first determines the current user's username by reading the system plist, then locates and exfiltrates the iMessage chat database and all referenced attachments to an attacker-controlled server (extraction_server.py, a Python Tornado web server). The exploit_list.txt file contains a sample malicious URI for use in attacks. The repository is structured with a detailed README explaining the vulnerability and attack chain, a Python server for receiving exfiltrated data, the JavaScript payload, and a sample exploit link. The main exploit capabilities are remote exfiltration of sensitive user data (messages and attachments) from a vulnerable OS X system, requiring only that the victim click a malicious link in iMessage.
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