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CVE-2016-6267 is a command injection vulnerability in Trend Micro Smart Protection Server versions 2.5 (before build 2200), 2.6 (before build 2106), and 3.0 (before build 1330). The vulnerability exists in the SnmpUtils component, specifically in the admin_notification.php script, where the parameters spare_Community, spare_AllowGroupIP, and spare_AllowGroupNetmask are not properly sanitized. This allows remote authenticated users to inject shell metacharacters and execute arbitrary commands on the underlying system.
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This repository contains a single Metasploit module (modules/exploits/linux/http/trendmicro_sps_exec.rb) that exploits a command injection vulnerability (CVE-2016-6267) in Trend Micro Smart Protection Server (SPS) for Linux. The exploit targets the 'ServWebExec' system command by injecting commands via the 'php/admin_notification.php' endpoint. Authentication is required, so valid admin credentials must be supplied. The module first authenticates to the SPS web interface, checks the version/build to confirm vulnerability, and then uses a POST request to inject and execute arbitrary commands. The exploit leverages Metasploit's CmdStager to deliver and execute payloads, such as a reverse shell. The code is written in Ruby and is fully integrated into the Metasploit framework, making it weaponized and easy to use for attackers with the required credentials. The main attack vector is network-based, targeting the HTTPS web interface of the SPS appliance.
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