CVE-2016-7200 is a memory corruption vulnerability in the Chakra JavaScript scripting engine used by Microsoft Edge. The vulnerability can be triggered by a specially crafted web page, which can cause the engine to improperly handle objects in memory, leading to memory corruption. This flaw is distinct from other similar vulnerabilities reported in the same timeframe.
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2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (2 hidden).
Small standalone proof-of-concept repository for Microsoft Edge Chakra exploitation. It contains two exploit HTML files under exploit/: a full RCE variant and a debugging variant without meaningful shellcode. The README identifies the bug chain as CVE-2016-7200 (Array.filter info leak) plus CVE-2016-7201 (FillFromPrototypes type confusion), tested on Windows 10 Edge. Repository structure is minimal: LICENSE, README.md, and two HTML exploit pages. Both HTML files embed JavaScript that relies on an external long.min.js library for 64-bit arithmetic. The code first uses PutDataAndGetAddr() to exploit the Array.filter species confusion/info leak and recover object addresses. It then uses TriggerFillFromPrototypesBug() to corrupt a DataView-like object and establish arbitrary memory read/write primitives via Read32/Read64/Write32/Write64. After gaining memory access, the exploit reads a vtable pointer to derive chakra.dll base, reads a thread context pointer from a hardcoded module offset, derives the stack region, and scans the stack for a known return address inside ScriptEngine::ExecutePendingScripts. Once found, it overwrites the saved return address with a crafted ROP chain. In the NoSC variant, the ROP chain explicitly prepares arguments for VirtualProtect, marks the shellcode page executable, and returns into a buffer containing 0xCCCC bytes. In the full variant, the embedded shellcode is much larger; per README it ultimately calls WinExec to launch notepad.exe. There are no external network callbacks, C2 endpoints, or hardcoded remote hosts. The exploit is delivered as a local/served HTML page and targets the browser process directly. Because it includes a working payload and hardcoded Chakra offsets rather than a reusable framework, it is best classified as an operational standalone browser RCE proof-of-concept.
This repository contains a proof-of-concept exploit for two vulnerabilities in Microsoft Edge's Chakra JavaScript engine (CVE-2016-7200 and CVE-2016-7201). The exploit is delivered as HTML/JavaScript files intended to be served from a web server and accessed by a vulnerable Edge browser on Windows 10. The main file, 'FillFromPrototypes_TypeConfusion.html', demonstrates remote code execution by exploiting a type confusion and info leak to execute arbitrary shellcode, specifically launching notepad.exe. The alternate file, 'FillFromPrototypes_TypeConfusion_NoSC.html', is a variant that triggers a software breakpoint (INT 3) for debugging purposes. The exploit leverages advanced JavaScript techniques to manipulate memory and achieve code execution. The repository is structured with a LICENSE, README, and two exploit files under the 'exploit/' directory. No hardcoded network endpoints or external IPs are present; the attack vector is browser-based, requiring the victim to visit the malicious HTML page.
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