pfSense versions 2.4.1 and earlier are vulnerable to clickjacking attacks on the CSRF error page. The vulnerability arises because the error detection logic is executed before the X-Frame-Options header is set, allowing the page to be embedded in a malicious frame. This can result in privileged execution of arbitrary code if an attacker tricks an authenticated user into interacting with a maliciously framed page. OPNsense, a fork of pfSense, removed the vulnerable code in version 16.1.16.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (modules/exploits/unix/http/pfsense_clickjacking.rb) that exploits a clickjacking vulnerability (CVE-2017-1000479) in pfSense <= 2.4.1. The exploit works by serving a malicious HTML page that tricks an authenticated pfSense admin into submitting a hidden form to the diag_command.php endpoint, resulting in the execution of arbitrary PHP code as root. The module leverages Metasploit's payload system to inject the attacker's code. The attack vector is browser-based social engineering, requiring the victim to be logged into the pfSense WebGUI and to visit the attacker's page. The code references static resources (JS, CSS, image) for the malicious page, and the main endpoints involved are the pfSense WebGUI (defaulting to https://192.168.1.1) and the diag_command.php script. The exploit is operational and can lead to full system compromise if successful.
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