Loading vulnerability…
A vulnerability in Android 8.0 and 8.1 exists in the OutputConfiguration.java class, specifically in the writeToParcel and readFromParcel methods. The issue arises from mismatched serialization logic, which allows a local attacker to bypass permission checks. As a result, an attacker can start an activity with system privileges without requiring additional execution privileges or user interaction.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a proof-of-concept (PoC) Android application targeting CVE-2017-13286, a vulnerability in the Android framework's OutputConfiguration parcelable implementation. The vulnerability arises from a mismatch between the fields written and read during parcel serialization/deserialization, allowing a malicious app to craft a Bundle that, when processed by the system, can result in the execution of arbitrary Intents. The repository is structured as a standard Android Studio project, with the main exploit logic implemented in the Java files under app/src/main/java/com/cve/poc201713286/. The key file is MyAuthenticator.java, which constructs a malicious Bundle containing a mismatched OutputConfiguration object and an embedded Intent targeting the system's password settings activity (com.android.settings.password.ChooseLockPassword). The AuthenticatorService is exported and can be started by the MainActivity, which triggers the exploit logic. The exploit demonstrates the vulnerability but does not provide a weaponized payload; it is intended for research and demonstration purposes only. The README and code comments reference the original AOSP source and explain the root cause of the bug. No network endpoints are present; the attack vector is local, requiring installation and execution of the app on a vulnerable device.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
No public activity tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
No public activity observed for this vulnerability.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.