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A vulnerability exists in the airbag control units (pyrotechnical control units, PCUs) of certain passenger vehicles manufactured in 2014 or later. The Security Access (SA) mechanism for the internal CAN bus (or OBD connector) uses only 256 possible key pairs, and there is no rate limiting on authentication attempts. Furthermore, at least one manufacturer's implementation of ISO 26021 allows direct calculation of the key, effectively reducing the key space to a single value. An attacker with access to the CAN bus can send a crafted Unified Diagnostic Service (UDS) message to trigger airbag detonation.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit post-exploitation module written in Ruby, located at 'modules/post/hardware/automotive/pdt.rb'. The module is designed to interact with automotive Pyrotechnic Control Units (PCUs) over a vehicle's CAN bus via a hardware bridge session. Its primary purpose is to enumerate pyrotechnic devices (such as airbags and battery clamps), attempt to unlock security access using a default algorithm, and prepare the vehicle for deployment of these devices. The exploit targets vehicles vulnerable to CVE-2017-14937, specifically those with PCUs implementing ISO 26021. The module requires access to the vehicle's internal CAN network and is capable of putting the vehicle into a dangerous state where pyrotechnic devices can be triggered, posing significant physical risk. The code is operational and not just a proof of concept, as it implements the full logic for querying, unlocking, and prepping the devices. No hardcoded IPs or URLs are present; the main fingerprintable endpoint is the CAN bus interface itself.
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