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OpenText Documentum Content Server (formerly EMC Documentum Content Server) through version 7.3 contains a design flaw in the handling of dmr_content objects. These objects, which store information about uploaded files, are queryable and modifiable by authenticated users. Prior to version 7.2P02, any authenticated user could edit dmr_content objects. In later versions, users can still delete a dmr_content object and recreate it with the same identifier. This allows an authenticated user to replace the content of security-sensitive dmr_content objects, such as those related to dm_method objects, and thereby gain superuser privileges.
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