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Xplico versions before 1.2.1 improperly handle shell metacharacters in uploaded PCAP filenames. An attacker can supply a crafted filename that is interpreted by a shell during processing, resulting in arbitrary command execution. Although the issue is described as affecting authenticated remote users, the product's user-registration feature permits exploitation without prior authentication.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (modules/exploits/linux/http/xplico_exec.rb) targeting a remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2017-16666) in Xplico, a network forensics analysis tool. The exploit leverages a command injection flaw in the PCAP file upload and processing functionality. The module automates the process of registering a new user (via /users/register), logging in, creating a new case and solution, and uploading a specially crafted PCAP file to trigger the vulnerability. The exploit achieves code execution as root by injecting commands into the checksum calculation routine. The module is written in Ruby and is structured according to Metasploit conventions, using the HttpClient mixin to interact with the target's web interface (default port 9876). The main attack vector is network-based, exploiting the HTTP interface of Xplico. The module is operational and provides a command execution payload, but is not weaponized for mass exploitation.
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