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Edgewater Networks EdgeMarc appliances expose a hidden page in the HTTP web-management application that accepts user-defined system commands. The page can be used as a web shell to execute valid commands on the appliance, including commands that configure iptables routes or retrieve content. The application does not return command output to the client, but valid commands execute server-side.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a Python exploit script (CVE-2017-6079.py) targeting Edgewater Networks Edgemarc devices vulnerable to CVE-2017-6079, a blind command injection flaw in the web management interface. The exploit leverages a hidden configuration page ('/cgi-bin/config?page=50&form=mainForm') that allows arbitrary command execution via the 'udefsEntries' parameter, authenticated with default credentials (root:default). The script supports two main operations: 'read' (to exfiltrate arbitrary files from the device) and 'upload' (to upload and execute an attacker-supplied ELF binary in /tmp/). It sets up a local HTTP server to serve payloads and receive exfiltrated data. The exploit is operational, requiring the attacker to supply the target and attacker IPs, operation mode, and file path. The README provides detailed usage instructions and context. The only code file is CVE-2017-6079.py; the other files are documentation. The main attack vector is network-based, exploiting the device's HTTP interface.
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