Loading vulnerability…
D-Link DGS-1510 Websmart switch models, including DGS-1510-28XMP, -28X, -52X, -52, -28P, -28, and -20, are vulnerable to unauthenticated information disclosure when running firmware earlier than version 1.31.B003. The disclosure can be triggered through unspecified vectors.
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository provides an exploit for CVE-2017-6206, targeting D-Link DGS-1510 Websmart switches with vulnerable firmware. The exploit consists of a Bash script (exploit.sh) that orchestrates the attack by calling two Python scripts: get-user-info.py and user_add.py. The get-user-info.py script retrieves user account information from the switch by sending an unauthenticated HTTP GET request to a specific endpoint. The user_add.py script sends an unauthenticated HTTP POST request to add a new administrative user (admin2:admin2) to the switch. The exploit.sh script automates the process: it first collects user info, then adds the new user, and finally verifies the addition by retrieving user info again. The attack is performed entirely over the network via HTTP, requiring only the target's IP address. The exploit demonstrates both information disclosure and authentication bypass, resulting in full administrative access to the device. The repository is structured with a README describing the vulnerability and usage, a Bash script as the main entry point, and two Python scripts implementing the core exploit logic.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
No public activity tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.
No public activity observed for this vulnerability.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.