CVE-2017-9947 is a directory traversal vulnerability in the integrated web server of Siemens APOGEE PXC and TALON TC BACnet Automation Controllers before version 3.5. A remote attacker with network access to the device web server can exploit the flaw to obtain information about the device file-system structure.
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This repository provides two Python scripts for exploiting an authentication bypass and path traversal vulnerability (CVE-2017-9947) in Siemens APOGEE PXC and TALON TC BACnet Automation Controllers (all versions prior to V3.5). The main exploit capability is to retrieve the hidden FieldPanel.xml file from the device's web server without authentication, exposing sensitive configuration details such as network settings, device information, and SNMP credentials. The repository contains: - APOLOGEE.py: A standalone Python script that takes a target IP address and fetches/parses FieldPanel.xml, printing out key configuration fields and service statuses. - siemens_field_panel_scanner.py: A Metasploit-compatible auxiliary scanner module that performs the same exploit, designed for integration into the Metasploit framework for use in OT/ICS network assessments. - README.md: Detailed documentation, including usage instructions, vulnerability background, affected products, and mitigation advice. - .github/workflows/pylint.yml: CI configuration for code linting. - LICENSE: Apache 2.0 license. The exploit is operational, not weaponized, as it automates information disclosure but does not provide post-exploitation payloads. The main attack vector is network-based, requiring access to the device's web server. The only fingerprintable endpoint is the FieldPanel.xml resource on the target device, accessed via HTTP. The exploit is effective against unpatched Siemens field panels and is useful for both vulnerability assessment and red teaming in building automation environments.
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