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LibreOffice 6.0.3 and Apache OpenOffice Writer 4.1.5 automatically process certain external resource references embedded in a malicious .odt document and initiate an SMB connection to an attacker-controlled host. As demonstrated, an xlink:href value such as file://192.168.0.2/test.jpg within an office:document-content element in the ODT’s XML can trigger the outbound SMB connection, resulting in information disclosure (e.g., leakage of authentication material/NTLM handshake data) to the remote SMB server.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).
This repository contains a single Metasploit auxiliary module (odt_badodt.rb) that generates a malicious ODT (OpenDocument Text) file targeting CVE-2018-10583. The exploit abuses a vulnerability in LibreOffice 6.0.3 and Apache OpenOffice 4.1.5, where opening a specially crafted ODT file causes the application to attempt to load a resource via SMB from an attacker-controlled server. This can result in the leakage of NTLM authentication hashes to the attacker. The module allows the user to specify the filename, document creator, and the attacker's SMB listener IP address (LHOST). The module constructs the necessary ODT structure, embedding a file:// link to the attacker's SMB server, and packages the files into a valid ODT archive. The exploit does not provide direct code execution but is used for credential capture via network interaction. The code is written in Ruby and is designed to be used within the Metasploit Framework.
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