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Windscribe VPN version 1.81 creates a system service (WindScribeService.exe) that exposes a named pipe (\.\pipe\WindscribeService) for inter-process communication. The service allows the Windscribe VPN process to request execution of OpenVPN or other processes via this pipe. However, the service does not validate the program name or command before passing it to CreateProcess, allowing an attacker with access to the named pipe to execute arbitrary commands with SYSTEM privileges.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module targeting a local privilege escalation vulnerability (CVE-2018-11479) in the Windscribe VPN client for Windows (versions prior to 1.82). The exploit abuses the 'WindscribeService.exe' Windows service, which exposes a named pipe ('\\.\pipe\WindscribeService') that allows unprivileged users to execute arbitrary programs as SYSTEM due to insufficient validation of user-supplied program names. The module writes a payload executable (default: windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp) to a writable directory (typically %TEMP%), then instructs the vulnerable service via the named pipe to execute the payload, resulting in SYSTEM-level code execution. The exploit is operational and requires local access to the target system. The repository structure is typical for a Metasploit module, with the exploit logic contained in a single Ruby file under the appropriate directory.
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