Loading vulnerability…
Apache Spark standalone master (from 1.3.0 onward) exposes a REST API for job submission that does not enforce authentication, even when the cluster is configured with the shared secret mechanism (spark.authenticate.secret) used by spark-submit. As a result, a network-reachable attacker can submit a job via the REST API without authenticating. The issue also affects Mesos-based deployments when using MesosClusterDispatcher for job submission, since it relies on the same REST submission path. The practical effect described is that an unauthenticated user can launch a Spark driver program via the REST API (though not launch executors via this REST path).
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Patch, then assume compromise.
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module (modules/exploits/linux/http/spark_unauth_rce.rb) that exploits an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2018-11770) in Apache Spark's standalone cluster mode via its REST API. The exploit works by generating a malicious Java payload (as a JAR), hosting it on a temporary HTTP server, and submitting a job to the Spark REST API that loads and executes the payload. The module leverages Metasploit's payload generation and delivery mechanisms, allowing for customizable post-exploitation actions. The main attack vector is network-based, targeting the REST API (default port 6066) without authentication. The exploit is weaponized, as it is part of the Metasploit framework and supports flexible payload options. The code is well-structured, with clear separation of version checking, payload delivery, and job submission logic.
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.