CVE-2018-15811 affects DNN (DotNetNuke) versions 9.2 through 9.2.1. According to the provided content, the product uses a weak encryption algorithm to protect input parameters. This indicates that sensitive or security-relevant parameters are protected with cryptography that is not sufficiently strong, allowing an attacker to potentially recover, tamper with, or otherwise defeat the intended protection of those parameters. Specific vulnerable functions or parameter names are not provided in the available content.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module targeting a deserialization vulnerability in DotNetNuke (DNN) versions 5.0.0 to 9.3.0-RC. The exploit abuses the DNNPersonalization cookie, which is processed by the application when handling user profile data, especially during 404 error handling. By crafting a malicious serialized .NET object (optionally encrypted and base64-encoded), the attacker can trigger arbitrary code execution on the Windows server. The module supports multiple DNN versions, handling differences in encryption and session requirements. The payload is typically a PowerShell command that opens a reverse shell or executes arbitrary code. The main network endpoint is the DNN web application, with the default trigger path set to '/__'. The exploit is weaponized, as it is part of the Metasploit framework and supports customizable payloads. The code is well-structured, with clear separation of payload creation, encryption, and delivery logic.
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