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CVE-2018-17153 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in Western Digital My Cloud devices prior to firmware 2.30.196. The vulnerability resides in the network_mgr.cgi CGI module, specifically in the cgi_get_ipv6 command. By sending a request with the parameter flag=1, an unauthenticated attacker can trigger the creation of an admin session bound to their IP address. Subsequent requests with the username=admin cookie allow the attacker to execute any admin-level CGI commands, effectively granting full control of the device without a password. The flaw was discovered via reverse engineering of the device's CGI binaries.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit module targeting Western Digital MyCloud NAS devices. The exploit leverages two vulnerabilities: an authentication bypass (CVE-2018-17153) and a command injection (CVE-2016-10108), both present in firmware versions before 2.30.196. The module first checks if the target is a WD MyCloud device, then attempts to bypass authentication by sending a GET request to '/cgi-bin/network_mgr.cgi'. If successful, it exploits the command injection in '/web/google_analytics.php' by sending a crafted POST request, allowing unauthenticated remote code execution as root. The module supports both in-memory command execution (reverse shell) and staged payloads (Meterpreter) for ARM-based devices. The code is written in Ruby and is fully integrated with the Metasploit framework, making it weaponized and highly customizable. The only file present is the Metasploit exploit module itself.
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