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A remote command execution vulnerability exists in TP-Link Archer C5 devices through firmware version V2_160201_US. The vulnerability is due to improper sanitization of shell metacharacters in the 'wan_dyn_hostname' field of the device's configuration file. An attacker with access to the web admin interface can upload a maliciously crafted configuration file (encrypted with key 478DA50BF9E3D2CF) to execute arbitrary commands on the device. The risk is exacerbated by the use of the default 'admin' password in some deployments.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository provides a proof-of-concept exploit for CVE-2018-19537, an authenticated remote code execution vulnerability in all published firmware versions of the TP-Link Archer C5 router. The exploit leverages the router's configuration file upload feature, which fails to properly sanitize parameters when restoring from a file. By decrypting a configuration file (using 'unbinify.py'), injecting a malicious shell command into the 'wan_dyn_hostname' parameter, and re-encrypting it (using 'binify.py'), an attacker can upload the file via the router's web interface. Upon reboot, the injected command is executed as root. The PoC demonstrates how to persistently execute arbitrary commands, including downloading and running further payloads from the internet. The repository includes two Python scripts for handling the router's DES-encrypted configuration files and a sample configuration file. The attack requires authenticated access to the router's web interface, but can be performed remotely if remote management is enabled. The exploit is impactful, providing persistent root access to the device.
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