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CVE-2018-4993 is an information disclosure vulnerability in Adobe Acrobat and Reader (versions 2018.011.20038 and earlier, 2017.011.30079 and earlier, and 2015.006.30417 and earlier) that allows attackers to steal NTLM SSO hashes. The vulnerability is exploited by embedding remote documents in a PDF file. When a user opens the malicious PDF, the Windows PDF viewer automatically attempts to fetch the remote resource, causing the system to leak NTLM credentials (hash, challenge, user, host name, and domain) via SMB to an attacker-controlled server, without any user interaction or warning.
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1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a single Metasploit auxiliary module, 'badpdf.rb', which generates malicious PDF files designed to exploit CVE-2018-4993. The module can either create a new PDF or inject a payload into an existing PDF. The payload is a UNC link (e.g., \\attacker_host\test) that, when the PDF is opened on a Windows system, causes the system to attempt authentication to an attacker-controlled SMB/WebDAV server, leaking NetNTLM credentials. The attacker must specify the LHOST (the server to receive the authentication attempt) and either a FILENAME for a new PDF or a PDFINJECT path for an existing PDF. The module is written in Ruby and is intended for use within the Metasploit Framework. No hardcoded endpoints are present; the attacker supplies the LHOST at runtime. The exploit targets Windows systems and leverages the way PDF readers handle embedded UNC links.
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